Impartiality and Consistency

It is quite commonly held nowadays that universalizability is a purely formal feature of moral terms, or perhaps of moral rules.To say that something is good, it is asserted, implies (in some sense of “implies”) that anything else with the same (relevant) characteristics is also good; to say that Jo...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Philosophy (London) 1961-04, Vol.36 (137), p.161-176
Main Author: Monro, D. H.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Analytic statements
Flatness
Impartiality
Maxims
Moral principles
Morality
Natural justice
Patriotism
Poetry
Sentimentality
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Summary:It is quite commonly held nowadays that universalizability is a purely formal feature of moral terms, or perhaps of moral rules.To say that something is good, it is asserted, implies (in some sense of “implies”) that anything else with the same (relevant) characteristics is also good; to say that Jones ought to do X is to commit oneself to saying that, in the same circumstances, Smith ought to do X. In pointing this out, it is suggested, one is not oneself taking up a moral position, or laying down a particular moral rule, but simply making it clear what a moral utterance is. The principle ofuniversalizability is thus a principle of meta-ethics, not of morality itself. That moral judgments are universalizable, Hare tells us, is an analytic statement: “analytic by virtue of the meaning of the word moral”.
ISSN:0031-8191
1469-817X
DOI:10.1017/S0031819100058010