Bargaining over productivity and wages when technical change is induced: implications for growth, distribution, and employment

I study a model of growth and income distribution in which workers and firms bargain à la Nash (Econometrica 18(2): 155-162, 1950) over wages and productivity gains, taking into account the trade-offs faced by firms in choosing factoraugmenting technologies. The aggregate environment resulting from...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:	Journal of economics (Vienna, Austria) Austria), 2013-07, Vol.109 (3), p.207-244
Main Author:	Tavani, Daniele
Format:	Article
Language:	English
Subjects:	Bargaining Bargaining power Bias Capitalism Changes Compensation Cost control Dynamical systems Economic growth Economic growth models Economic growth rate Economic models Economic policy Economic statistics Economic theory Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Employment Employment rates Equilibrium Game Theory Growth models Income distribution Institutional change Investments Labor Labor economics Labor productivity Labour productivity Long run equilibrium Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics Market equilibrium Microeconomics Phillips curve Productivity Public Finance Qualitative analysis Savings and investment Social and Behav. Sciences Socialism Studies Technological change U.S.A Unemployment Unemployment benefits Wages Wages & salaries Workers
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