On Sterba's Argument from Rationality to Morality

James Sterba argues for morality as a principled compromise between self-regarding and other-regarding reasons (Morality as Compromise) and that either egoists or altruists, who always give overriding weight to self-regarding and other-reasons, respectively, can be shown to beg the question against...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The journal of ethics 2014-09, Vol.18 (3), p.243-252
Main Author: Darwall, Stephen
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Altruism
Blame
Dialectic
Education
Egoism
Ethics
Moralism
Morality
Normativity
Philosophy
Political Philosophy
Rational egoism
Rationality
Reason
Sterba, James P
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Summary:James Sterba argues for morality as a principled compromise between self-regarding and other-regarding reasons (Morality as Compromise) and that either egoists or altruists, who always give overriding weight to self-regarding and other-reasons, respectively, can be shown to beg the question against morality. He concludes that moral conduct is "rationally required." Sterba's dialectic assumes that both egoists and altruists accept that both self-regarding and other-regarding considerations are genuine pro tanto reasons, but then hold that their respective reasons always outweigh. Against this, I argue that egoists would most plausibly deny that non-self-regarding considerations have even pro tanto weight. I argue, also, that even if both sides grant the pro tanto weight of their opponent's reasons, Sterba is mistaken in holding that only Morality as Compromise provides a "nonquestion-begging resolution" of what it is rational to do when self-regarding and other-regarding reasons conflict, since it might be that it is rational to act on either.It might be that the weightiest self-regarding and the weightiest other-regarding reasons in the case are both sufficient reasons for acting without either being conclusive.The essay ends with a sketch of arguments against egoism that I take to be more plausible than Sterba's. As I have argued elsewhere, what makes an agent's own welfare or her own concerns or interests normative for her simultaneously makes them normative for others as well.
ISSN:1382-4554
1572-8609
DOI:10.1007/s10892-014-9174-1