All for the Good

The Guise of the Good thesis has received much attention since Anscombe's brief defence in her book Intention. I approach it here from a less common perspective ‐ indirectly, via a theory explaining how it is that moral behaviour is even possible. After setting out how morality requires the emp...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Philosophical investigations 2015-01, Vol.38 (1-2), p.72-95
Main Author: Oderberg, David S.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Metaphysics
Morality
Philosophy
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Summary:The Guise of the Good thesis has received much attention since Anscombe's brief defence in her book Intention. I approach it here from a less common perspective ‐ indirectly, via a theory explaining how it is that moral behaviour is even possible. After setting out how morality requires the employment of a fundamental test, I argue that moral behaviour involves orientation toward the good. Immoral behaviour cannot, however, involve orientation to evil as such, given the theory of evil as privation. There must always be orientation to good of some kind for immorality even to be possible. Evil can, nevertheless, be intended, but this must be carefully understood in terms of the metaphysic of good and evil I set out. Given that metaphysic, the Guise of the Good is a virtual corollary.
ISSN:0190-0536
1467-9205
DOI:10.1111/phin.12070