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A Hardware-Based Countermeasure to Reduce Side-Channel Leakage: Design, Implementation, and Evaluation

Side-channel attacks are one of the major concerns for security-enabled applications as they make use of information leaked by the physical implementation of the underlying cryptographic algorithm. Hence, reducing the side-channel leakage of the circuits realizing the cryptographic primitives is amo...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:IEEE transactions on computer-aided design of integrated circuits and systems 2015-08, Vol.34 (8), p.1308-1319
Main Authors: Gornik, Andreas, Moradi, Amir, Oehm, Jurgen, Paar, Christof
Format: Article
Language:English
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Summary:Side-channel attacks are one of the major concerns for security-enabled applications as they make use of information leaked by the physical implementation of the underlying cryptographic algorithm. Hence, reducing the side-channel leakage of the circuits realizing the cryptographic primitives is amongst the main goals of circuit designers. In this paper, we present a novel circuit concept, which decouples the main power supply from an internal power supply that is used to drive a single logic gate. The decoupling is done with the help of buffering capacitances integrated into semiconductor. We also introduce-compared to the previously known schemes-an improved decoupling circuit which reduces the crosstalk from the internal to the external power supply. The result of practical side-channel evaluation on a prototype chip fabricated in a 150nm CMOS technology shows a high potential of our proposed technique to reduce the side-channel leakages.
ISSN:0278-0070
1937-4151
DOI:10.1109/TCAD.2015.2423274