The Federal Trade Commission as an independent agency: autonomy, legitimacy, and effectiveness

On Mar 16, 1915, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") opened for business and began what has proven to be a uniquely compelling experiment in economic regulation. The FTC was the first law enforcement agency to be designed "from the keel up" as a competition agency. One vital con...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Iowa law review 2015-07, Vol.100 (5), p.2085
Main Authors: Kovacic, William E, Winerman, Marc
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Accountability
Antitrust law
Common markets
Competition policy
Evaluation
Independent regulatory commissions
Judicial reviews
Law enforcement
Legislators
Legitimacy
Management
Political appointments
Politics
Powers and duties
Regulatory agencies
Roles
Studies
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Summary:On Mar 16, 1915, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") opened for business and began what has proven to be a uniquely compelling experiment in economic regulation. The FTC was the first law enforcement agency to be designed "from the keel up" as a competition agency. One vital consideration in forming the new institution was to define its relationship to the political process. Among other features in the original FTC Act, Congress provided that the agency's commissioners would have fixed, seven-year terms and that a commissioner could be removed during his or her term only for cause. Through these and other design choices, Congress created what would come to be known as the world's first "independent" competition agency. The FTC's degree of insulation from direct political control supplied an influential model of institutional design and contributed to the acceptance of a norm, evident in modern commentary about competition law, that public enforcement agencies should be politically independent.
ISSN:0021-0552