Prinzipal-Agent-Beziehungen und Dritte / Principal-agent relationships and third parties

International actors often work together with pro-government armed groups in international military interventions. In Afghanistan, the use of such force multipliers to relieve international troops and support counterinsurgency efforts has reached unprecedented dimensions. Especially the United State...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Zeitschrift für internationale Beziehungen 2016-01, Vol.23 (1), p.71
Main Authors: Friesendorf, Cornelius, Krahmann, Elke
Format: Article
Language:ger
Subjects:
Armed forces
Computer security
Counterinsurgency
Human rights
Military intervention
Political science theories
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Summary:International actors often work together with pro-government armed groups in international military interventions. In Afghanistan, the use of such force multipliers to relieve international troops and support counterinsurgency efforts has reached unprecedented dimensions. Especially the United States has collaborated with three types of force multipliers: private security companies, militias, and auxiliary police. For civilians in Afghanistan, however, this practice has proven problematic in that all three types of force multipliers have violated human rights and exploited the local population. Based on principal-agent theory, this article seeks to explain why force multipliers have become a problem for civilians. It argues that a complex network of overlapping principal-agent relations emerged in Afghanistan through which asymmetries of interests and information between the US, local principals, and force multipliers proliferated. This network has prevented the effective control of force multipliers.
ISSN:0946-7165