Loading…
Property and Homelessness
To the extent that philosophers think about homelessness, they seem to see it as a problem of unjust distribution of resources. It is that. But it is also something else, something more basic, having to do with the proper constitution of a society of moral agents and in particular the role of proper...
Saved in:
Published in: | Philosophy & public affairs 2016-09, Vol.44 (4), p.266-295 |
---|---|
Main Author: | |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Summary: | To the extent that philosophers think about homelessness, they seem to see it as a problem of unjust distribution of resources. It is that. But it is also something else, something more basic, having to do with the proper constitution of a society of moral agents and in particular the role of property rights as constituents of such a society. It is a problem about property, its justification, and the moral constraints on its realization. To understand homelessness we need to understand property, and to understand property we need to understand homelessness. Here I try to do both. According to the view I will defend, property rights are justifiable because they can uniquely provide a solution to homelessness. Homelessness is a distinctive condition constituted not by a lack of goods or access to goods but by a lack of rights, in particular property rights. To be homeless is to be under the power of others—to be dominated by them or dependent on them—in respect of where one may be. Homelessness is not created by property rights; rather, without property rights everyone would be homeless, since everyone would be subject to the power of others, as the homeless are now. Property’s justification lies in its capacity to serve as a unique moral tool to eliminate this problematic way that one can have power over another. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 0048-3915 1088-4963 |
DOI: | 10.1111/papa.12080 |