Quine on Translation and Logical Deviance

This paper clarifies and scrutinizes Quine’s so-called “translation argument,” according to which people who appear to reject our logic are just people whose utterances have been badly translated. It is claimed that this argument, rightly understood, does not contradict Quine’s view that logic is re...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Monist 2017-04, Vol.100 (2), p.228-248
Main Author: Gustafsson, Martin
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Analysis
Behavioral psychology
Criticism and interpretation
Empiricism
Holism
Logic
Philosophers
Philosophy
Quine, W V
Translation
Translation (Languages)
Translations
Truth
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Summary:This paper clarifies and scrutinizes Quine’s so-called “translation argument,” according to which people who appear to reject our logic are just people whose utterances have been badly translated. It is claimed that this argument, rightly understood, does not contradict Quine’s view that logic is revisable. The connection between the translation argument and Quine’s criticism of Carnap’s conception of logical truth is investigated, and an apparent tension is identified between two strands of the argument: one according to which the idea of logical aliens are empty, the other according to which such aliens are just very unlikely. The second strand is bound up with Quine’s use of the principle of charity, and with his idea that logical truths are tied to translation in no deeper sense than other obvious truths. It is argued that the tension between the two strands of the argument can be resolved only if the centrality of linguistic behaviorism in Quine’s philosophy is fully appreciated. However, logic is as such more difficult to accommodate within this behaviorist framework than Quine seems to recognize, and it is argued that Quine must ultimately lose sight of logic altogether. The revisions which the translation argument undergoes in The Roots of Reference do not solve this problem, but, if anything, only accentuate it further. Finally, it is suggested that Quine’s very last works are more logic-friendly, but that the tension remains between such logic-friendliness and Quine’s apparently unwavering commitment to linguistic behaviorism.
ISSN:0026-9662
2153-3601
DOI:10.1093/monist/onx006