Serving Two Masters: Professionalization versus Corruption in Ukraine's Election Administration

The development of a neutral, professional bureaucracy has been a profound concern for emerging democracies. International and domestic actors have expended significant resources to encourage the development of the rule of law, yet many postcommunist societies remain mired in corruption. When corrup...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Governance (Oxford) 2017-10, Vol.30 (4), p.601-619
Main Authors: Herron, Erik S., Boyko, Nazar, Thunberg, Michael E.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Administrators
Bureaucracy
Corruption
Democratization
Elections
Electoral reform
Implementation
Incentives
Parliamentary elections
Polls & surveys
Postcommunist societies
Professionalization
Rule of law
Rules
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:The development of a neutral, professional bureaucracy has been a profound concern for emerging democracies. International and domestic actors have expended significant resources to encourage the development of the rule of law, yet many postcommunist societies remain mired in corruption. When corrupt behaviors are integrated with a core function of democratic states, such as the implementation of free and fair elections, the implications of failures to professionalize bureaucrats are enhanced. This article empirically evaluates how professionalization and corruption interact in election administration, using unique survey data from Ukraine. We assess the results of pre‐ and postelection surveys of administrators conducted across Ukraine during the 2014 parliamentary elections. Our results suggest that aspects of a professionalized bureaucracy coexist with corruption and that mitigating incentives for state capture is a major challenge for democratization.
ISSN:0952-1895
1468-0491
DOI:10.1111/gove.12247