The genesis of Independent agencies

This Article sheds light on significant doctrinal and policy issues that are central to the proper understanding of the administrative state. It grapples with a core question of administrative law: When are agencies established with features that insulate them from direct presidential control? Becau...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:New York University law review (1950) 2017-06, Vol.92 (3), p.637-697
Main Authors: Corrigan, Patrick M, Revesz, Richard L
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Administrative agencies
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Datasets
EVIDENCE
Executive power
Independent regulatory commissions
Legislatures
LITERATURE
Multivariate analysis
Officials and employees
Presidents
Probability
Protection
Public officers
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Summary:This Article sheds light on significant doctrinal and policy issues that are central to the proper understanding of the administrative state. It grapples with a core question of administrative law: When are agencies established with features that insulate them from direct presidential control? Because of its constitutional significance, the legal literature focuses on removal protection for agency heads, and posits that agencies are more likely to be accorded such protection when the presidency and at least one of the chambers of Congress are controlled by different parties. The empirical support for this claim comes from a single political science study, which suffers from significant design flaws and has been widely misinterpreted. In fact, it shows that under almost all plausible scenarios Congress is less likely to vest agencies with indicia of independence under divided government.
ISSN:0028-7881