Comparing Fixed-Point and Revision Theories of Truth

In response to the liar's paradox, Kripke developed the fixed-point semantics for languages expressing their own truth concepts. (Martin and Woodruff independently developed this semantics, but not to the same extent as Kripke.) Kripke's work suggests a number of related fixed-point theori...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of philosophical logic 2009-08, Vol.38 (4), p.363-403
Main Author: Kremer, Philip
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Cardinality
Education
Logic
Mathematical functions
Philosophical logics. Philosophy of language
Philosophy
Predicates
Semantics
Signification
Supervenience
Symbolism
Truth
Truth value
Vocabulary
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Summary:In response to the liar's paradox, Kripke developed the fixed-point semantics for languages expressing their own truth concepts. (Martin and Woodruff independently developed this semantics, but not to the same extent as Kripke.) Kripke's work suggests a number of related fixed-point theories of truth for such languages. Gupta and Belnap develop their revision theory of truth in contrast to the fixed-point theories. The current paper considers three natural ways to compare the various resulting theories of truth, and establishes the resulting relationships among these theories. The point is to get a sense of the lay of the land amid a variety of options. Our results will also provide technical fodder for the methodological remarks of the companion paper to this one.
ISSN:0022-3611
1573-0433
DOI:10.1007/s10992-009-9107-9