Where's the Bridge? Epistemology and Epistemic Logic

Ka:Kapwhich states that if p is not the case, then a knows that he does not know pthe truly Socratic person as Girle (2000,p. 157) explains knowing exactly how ignorant he is. Since axiom 5 is dropped and (5) is no longer a theorem,f:p; :Ka:Kapg and f: There is no guarantee that a knower will recogn...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Philosophical studies 2006-03, Vol.128 (1), p.137-167
Main Authors: Hendricks, Vincent F., Symons, John
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Accessibility relation
Axioms
Belief
Computer science
Epistemic logic
Epistemology
Essays
Game theory
Knowledge
Logic
Modal epistemology
Modal logic
Model theory
Philosophers
Philosophy
Skepticism
Theory
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:Ka:Kapwhich states that if p is not the case, then a knows that he does not know pthe truly Socratic person as Girle (2000,p. 157) explains knowing exactly how ignorant he is. Since axiom 5 is dropped and (5) is no longer a theorem,f:p; :Ka:Kapg and f: There is no guarantee that a knower will recognize that he is committed to some proposition that is logically equivalent to some proposition to which he or she readily assents. Since this is the case, then, Hocutt suggests, the very idea of an epistemic logic is on slippery ground. [...]the demon scenario, brain-in-a-vat scenario and other derivatives of global underdetermination are simply excluded from the compatibility partition; these extravagant scenarios are not in accordance with the epistemic attitude. [...]these error-possibilities will not disturb the context, or in Hintikkian terms, will not pass over into the compatibility partition, so knowledge is closed for a given compatible partition, i.e. uniform context.10Textual evidence for the autoepistemological interpretation is available at some striking points in the argument of Knowledge and Belief. First-Order Modal Logic, forthcoming in Hendricks and Pedersen (2005).Aumann, R.J. (1999a): Interactive Epistemology I:
ISSN:0031-8116
1573-0883
DOI:10.1007/s11098-005-4060-0