THE NON-DEMOCRATIC ROOTS OF ELITE CAPTURE: EVIDENCE FROM SOEHARTO MAYORS IN INDONESIA

Democracies widely differ in the extent to which powerful elites and interest groups retain influence over politics. While a large literature argues that elite capture is rooted in a country's history, our understanding of the determinants of elite persistence is limited. In this paper, we show...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Econometrica 2017-11, Vol.85 (6), p.1991-2010
Main Authors: Martinez-Bravo, Monica, Mukherjee, Priya, Stegmann, Andreas
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
de facto power
Democracy
democratic transitions
Elite capture
Elites
Governance
Indonesia
Interest groups
Mayors
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Politics
public good provision
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Summary:Democracies widely differ in the extent to which powerful elites and interest groups retain influence over politics. While a large literature argues that elite capture is rooted in a country's history, our understanding of the determinants of elite persistence is limited. In this paper, we show that allowing old-regime agents to remain in office during democratic transitions is a key determinant of the extent of elite capture. We exploit quasi-random from Indonesia: Soeharto-regime mayors were allowed to finish their terms before being replaced by new leaders. Since mayors' political cycles were not synchronized, this event generated exogenous variation in how long old-regime mayors remained in their position during the democratic transition. Districts with longer exposure to old-regime mayors experience worse governance outcomes, higher elite persistence, and lower political competition in the medium run. The results suggest that slower transitions towards democracy allow the old-regime elites to capture democracy.
ISSN:0012-9682
1468-0262
DOI:10.3982/ECTA14125