Must We Be Just Plain Good? On Regress Arguments for the Value of Humanity

There is an argument according to which there must be something nonrelationally valuable for anything to be of value. The chains of dependence between values must come to an end, and humanity meets the specifications. I explore alternatives to terminating a regress in nonrelational value and give re...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Ethics 2018-01, Vol.128 (2), p.346-372
Main Author: Theunissen, L. Nandi
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Ethics
Interdependence
Optimism
Prospects
Regression analysis
Value
Values
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Summary:There is an argument according to which there must be something nonrelationally valuable for anything to be of value. The chains of dependence between values must come to an end, and humanity meets the specifications. I explore alternatives to terminating a regress in nonrelational value and give reason to reject the "borrowing" conception of relational value that drives the argument. I doubt that the nonrelational value of humanity can be secured by an argument from the structure of value, but I am optimistic about the prospects for explaining our value relationally and give reason to favor a reflexive relational model.
ISSN:0014-1704
1539-297X
DOI:10.1086/694273