Evolutionary Theories of Competition and Aftermarket Antitrust Law

Underlying the current debate about aftermarket competition is a fundamental zeitgeist issue, a disquiet about the intellectual foundations of antitrust law. From the perspective of modern evolutionary theories of competition, the problem is outdated rule of reason legal precedents buttressed by the...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Antitrust bulletin 2007-03, Vol.52 (1), p.73-93
Main Author: Dickson, Peter R.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Aftermarkets
Antitrust law
Antitrust laws
Competition
Evaluation
Intellectual property law
Supply & demand
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:Underlying the current debate about aftermarket competition is a fundamental zeitgeist issue, a disquiet about the intellectual foundations of antitrust law. From the perspective of modern evolutionary theories of competition, the problem is outdated rule of reason legal precedents buttressed by the application of a primitive theoretical paradigm. Deadweight intellectual capital, based on primitive economic principles, is indisputably ensconced in antitrust expertise and case law. In conclusion, when aftermarket innovations have the potential of adding greatly to the value of primary equipment, and other potentially strong (latent) feedback effects are likely to exist between supply and demand within the aftermarket and between supply and demand within the aftermarket and the primary market, it makes no sense to try to monopolize the secondary market. Neither does it make economic sense to give away the store, make no profits in the aftermarket, and only make profits in the primary market.
ISSN:0003-603X
1930-7969
DOI:10.1177/0003603X0705200105