Merit, Tenure, and Bureaucratic Behavior: Evidence From a Conjoint Experiment in the Dominican Republic

Bureaucratic behavior in developing countries remains poorly understood. Why do some public servants—yet not others—work hard to deliver public services, misuse state resources, and/or participate in electoral mobilization? A classic answer comes from Weber: Bureaucratic structures shift behavior to...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Comparative political studies 2018-05, Vol.51 (6), p.759-792
Main Authors: Oliveros, Virginia, Schuster, Christian
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Behavior
Bureaucracy
Bureaucrats
Competition
Corruption
Democracy
Developing countries
Elections
Government employees
LDCs
Mobilization
Morality
Motivation
Neutrality
Occupational achievement
Patronage
Public services
Recruitment
Social services
Tenure
Work
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:Bureaucratic behavior in developing countries remains poorly understood. Why do some public servants—yet not others—work hard to deliver public services, misuse state resources, and/or participate in electoral mobilization? A classic answer comes from Weber: Bureaucratic structures shift behavior toward integrity, neutrality, and commitment to public service. Our study conducts the first survey experimental test of the effects of bureaucratic structures. It does so through a conjoint experiment with public servants in the Dominican Republic. Looking at merit examinations and job stability, we find that Weber was right—but only partially. Recruitment by examination curbs corruption and political services by bureaucrats, while enhancing work motivation. Job stability, by contrast, only decreases political services: Tenured bureaucrats are less likely to participate in electoral mobilization. Examinations thus enhance the quality of bureaucracy (motivation and lower corruption) and democracy (electoral competition); job stability only enhances the quality of democracy.
ISSN:0010-4140
1552-3829
DOI:10.1177/0010414017710268