Loading…
Employment Tax Credit Programs: The Effects of Socioeconomic Targeting Provisions
Wage cost subsidies, such as the employment tax credit, are appealing to labor economists concerned with the effects of minimum wage laws and other barriers to downward wage-rate flexibility in low-skill labor markets. In principle, any disemployment effects of a minimum wage law can be offset by a...
Saved in:
Published in: | The Journal of human resources 1982-07, Vol.17 (3), p.449-459 |
---|---|
Main Author: | |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Summary: | Wage cost subsidies, such as the employment tax credit, are appealing to labor economists concerned with the effects of minimum wage laws and other barriers to downward wage-rate flexibility in low-skill labor markets. In principle, any disemployment effects of a minimum wage law can be offset by a wage-cost subsidy of the proper amount. This assumes that entrepreneurs can use the subsidy without significantly changing their hiring and personnel practices. This overlooks a major feature of the 2 counter-structural employment tax credit programs that have been tried - that these programs do not provide a general subsidy that an employer can apply to any worker or even to any low-skill workers hired. Instead, these programs are highly targeted on very specific socioeconomic groups. An attempt is made to show that this narrow socioeconomic targeting approach makes it highly unlikely that the subsidy program will be able to achieve the desired effect of significantly increasing the employment level of the target group. A survey revealed that firms have strong preferences for less targeted programs. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 0022-166X 1548-8004 |
DOI: | 10.2307/145591 |