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Education, social mobility, and the mismatch of talents

This study presents a two-class, overlapping-generation model featuring social mobility inhibited by the mismatch of talents. Mobility decreases as the private education gap between the two classes widens, whereas it increases with increased public education spending. Within this framework, the stud...

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Published in:	Economic theory 2018-05, Vol.65 (3), p.575-607
Main Author:	Uchida, Yuki
Format:	Article
Language:	English
Subjects:	Analysis Economic aspects Economic theory Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Education Expenditures Forecasts and trends Game Theory Intergenerational mobility Microeconomics Political power Public expenditures Public Finance Public schools Research Article Social and Behav. Sciences Social mobility Upward mobility Voting
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container_end_page	607
container_issue	3
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container_title	Economic theory
container_volume	65
creator	Uchida, Yuki
description	This study presents a two-class, overlapping-generation model featuring social mobility inhibited by the mismatch of talents. Mobility decreases as the private education gap between the two classes widens, whereas it increases with increased public education spending. Within this framework, the study considers voting on public education and shows that when the political power of the rich is strong, the government implements low redistributive expenditures, which in turn induces a cyclical motion of social mobility across generations.
doi_str_mv	10.1007/s00199-016-1027-7
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source	EconLit s plnými texty; EBSCOhost Business Source Ultimate; International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection; ABI/INFORM Global; Springer Nature; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts
subjects	Analysis Economic aspects Economic theory Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Education Expenditures Forecasts and trends Game Theory Intergenerational mobility Microeconomics Political power Public expenditures Public Finance Public schools Research Article Social and Behav. Sciences Social mobility Upward mobility Voting
title	Education, social mobility, and the mismatch of talents
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