Conflicting Selves: Family Owners' Multiple Goals and Self-Control Agency Problems in Private Firms

This study examines the self–control agency problems associated with family ownership in private firms. Theorizing that family owners’ inner conflicts between economic and non–economic goals lead to competing preferences in the allocation of financial resources, we predict that the relationship betw...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Entrepreneurship theory and practice 2018-05, Vol.42 (3), p.362-389
Main Authors: De Massis, Alfredo, Kotlar, Josip, Mazzola, Pietro, Minola, Tommaso, Sciascia, Salvatore
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Closely held corporations
Companies
Economic models
Family owned businesses
Objectives
Owners
Ownership
Profitability
Resource allocation
Self control
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:This study examines the self–control agency problems associated with family ownership in private firms. Theorizing that family owners’ inner conflicts between economic and non–economic goals lead to competing preferences in the allocation of financial resources, we predict that the relationship between financial slack and firm profitability is contingent on factors that increase the potential salience of either economic or noneconomic goals for family owners. Accordingly, our findings suggest that self–control is a separate source of agency costs in private firms and that family ownership is not as crucial as owners’ goals in predicting the impact of financial slack on firm profitability.
ISSN:1042-2587
1540-6520
DOI:10.1111/etap.12257