The Problem of the Motivation for the Phenomenological Reduction

Naberhaus examines what can motivate reduction's enactment. He first lays out the paradox in detail--scientific phenomenology depends on bracketing the "general thesis" of the natural attitude--naive world-belief--which, Edmund Husserl claims, is within people's "complete fr...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Philosophy today (Celina) 2005, Vol.49 (Supplement), p.212-221
Main Author: Naberhaus, Thane Martin
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Attitudes
Husserl, Edmund (1859-1938)
Literary criticism
Logic
Philosophers
Philosophy
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:Naberhaus examines what can motivate reduction's enactment. He first lays out the paradox in detail--scientific phenomenology depends on bracketing the "general thesis" of the natural attitude--naive world-belief--which, Edmund Husserl claims, is within people's "complete freedom." But to do so they must first recognize the general thesis, and ordinary reflection, which is not concerned with such belief at all, cannot lead them there. But if phenomenological reflection is able to thematize this sort of belief, then the reduction must have already been carried out, and people are caught in an apparent circularity.
ISSN:0031-8256
2329-8596
DOI:10.5840/philtoday200549Supplement26