Incentives in Experiments: A Theoretical Analysis

Experimental economists currently lack a convention for how to pay subjects in experiments with multiple tasks. We provide a theoretical framework for analyzing this question. Assuming statewise monotonicity and nothing else, we prove that paying for one randomly chosen problem—the random problem se...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Journal of political economy 2018-08, Vol.126 (4), p.1472-1503
Main Authors: Azrieli, Yaron, Chambers, Christopher P., Healy, Paul J.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Economic theory
Economists
Experiments
Incentives
Political economy
Studies
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