A more substantive neuron doctrine

First, it is not clear from Gold & Stoljar's definition of biological neuroscience whether it includes computational and representational concepts. If so, then their evaluation of Kandel's theory is problematic. If not, then a more direct refutation of the radical neuron doctrine is av...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Behavioral and brain sciences 1999-10, Vol.22 (5), p.843-844
Main Author: Lau, Joe Y. F.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Biology
Brain
Criticism
Gold & Stoljar: A neuron doctrine
Neurology
Open Peer Commentary
Philosophy
Psychology
Science
Theory
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:First, it is not clear from Gold & Stoljar's definition of biological neuroscience whether it includes computational and representational concepts. If so, then their evaluation of Kandel's theory is problematic. If not, then a more direct refutation of the radical neuron doctrine is available. Second, objections to the psychological sciences might derive not just from the conflation of the radical and the trivial neuron doctrines. There might also be the implicit belief that, for many mental phenomena, adequate theories must invoke neurophysiological concepts and cannot be purely psychological.
ISSN:0140-525X
1469-1825
DOI:10.1017/S0140525X99382194