Embodiment, enaction, and developing spatial knowledge: Beyond deficit egocentrism?

Traditional cognitivism treats a situated agent's point of view in terms of deficit egocentrism. Can Ballard et al.'s framework remedy this characterization? And will its fusion of computational and enactivist explanations change assumptions about what cognition is? “Yes” is suggested by c...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Behavioral and brain sciences 1997-12, Vol.20 (4), p.754-755
Main Author: Rutkowska, Julie C.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Ballard et al.: Deictic codes
Brain
Child development
Cognition & reasoning
Motor ability
Open Peer Commentary
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:Traditional cognitivism treats a situated agent's point of view in terms of deficit egocentrism. Can Ballard et al.'s framework remedy this characterization? And will its fusion of computational and enactivist explanations change assumptions about what cognition is? “Yes” is suggested by considering human infants' developing spatial knowledge, but further questions are raised by analysis of their robot counterparts.
ISSN:0140-525X
1469-1825
DOI:10.1017/S0140525X97381618