Reductionism and the neuron doctrine: A metaphysical fix of Gold & Stoljar's trivial–radical distinction

The trivial neuron doctrine (TND) holds that psychology merely depends on neurobiology. The radical neuron doctrine (RND) goes further and claims that psychology is superfluous in that neuroscience can “replace it.” Popular among RND notions of “replacement” is “reduction,” and in our commentary we...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Behavioral and brain sciences 1999-10, Vol.22 (5), p.835-836
Main Authors: Fahey, James, Zenzen, Michael
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Criticism
Definitions
Differences
Gold & Stoljar: A neuron doctrine
Neurology
Open Peer Commentary
Philosophy
Psychology
Theory
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Summary:The trivial neuron doctrine (TND) holds that psychology merely depends on neurobiology. The radical neuron doctrine (RND) goes further and claims that psychology is superfluous in that neuroscience can “replace it.” Popular among RND notions of “replacement” is “reduction,” and in our commentary we challenge Gold & Stoljar (G&S) to make clear their distinction between merely depends on (TND) and is reducible to (RND). G&S give us a TND–RND distinction that is a distinction without a difference; a defensible TND–RND distinction must have a metaphysical basis. We suggest a denial of compositionalism as such a basis.
ISSN:0140-525X
1469-1825
DOI:10.1017/S0140525X99282192