Fundraising for Favors? Linking Lobbyist-Hosted Fundraisers to Legislative Benefits

Do legislators and lobbyists trade favors? This study uses uncommon data sources and plagiarism software to detect a rarely observed relationship between interest group lobbyists and sitting Members of Congress. Comparison of letters to a Senate committee written by lobby groups to legislative amend...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Political research quarterly 2018-12, Vol.71 (4), p.869-880
Main Author: McKay, Amy Melissa
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Amendments
Bills
Campaign contributions
Campaigns
Congressional committees
Elections
Fund raising
Health care policy
Insurance industry
Interest groups
Legislators
Legislatures
Lobbying
Lobbyists
Negative campaigning
Plagiarism
Politics
Revenue
Software
Subsidies
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Summary:Do legislators and lobbyists trade favors? This study uses uncommon data sources and plagiarism software to detect a rarely observed relationship between interest group lobbyists and sitting Members of Congress. Comparison of letters to a Senate committee written by lobby groups to legislative amendments introduced by committee members reveals similar and even identical language, providing compelling evidence that groups persuaded legislators to introduce amendments valued by the group. Moreover, the analysis suggests that these language matches are more likely when the requesting lobby group hosts a fundraising event for the senator. The results hold while controlling for ideological agreement between the senator and the group, the group's campaign contributions to the senator, and the group's lobbying expenditures, annual revenue, and home-state connections.
ISSN:1065-9129
1938-274X
DOI:10.1177/1065912918771745