Evidence on the equivalence of the strategic and extensive form representation of games

Our experiment tests whether strategically equivalent representations of games produce equivalent behavior when actually played. We examine representative members of the class of generic 2×2 extensive form games of perfect information and the equivalent strategic form games. Systematic differences e...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of economic theory 2003-06, Vol.110 (2), p.290-308
Main Authors: Cooper, David Jacob, Van Huyck, John B
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Economic models
Game theory
Optimization
Studies
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:Our experiment tests whether strategically equivalent representations of games produce equivalent behavior when actually played. We examine representative members of the class of generic 2×2 extensive form games of perfect information and the equivalent strategic form games. Systematic differences exist between subjects' choices in the strategic and extensive form representations. These differences cannot be attributed to differences in subjects' ability to do backwards induction, in the salience of interpersonal preferences, or in optimization premiums between the two game forms. Instead, subjects in the extensive form are consistently more likely to allow the other player to make a meaningful choice. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
ISSN:0022-0531
1095-7235
DOI:10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00040-1