A Lightweight Masked AES Implementation for Securing IoT Against CPA Attacks

A false key-based advanced encryption standard (AES) technique is proposed to prevent the stored secret key leaking from the substitution-box under correlation power analysis (CPA) attacks without significant power and area overhead. Wave dynamic differential logic (WDDL)-based XOR gates are utilize...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:IEEE transactions on circuits and systems. I, Regular papers Regular papers, 2017-11, Vol.64 (11), p.2934-2944
Main Authors: Weize Yu, Kose, Selcuk
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Correlation analysis
Correlation power analysis attacks
Encryption
Engines
false key-based masking
Gates (circuits)
Integrated circuits
IoT security
Lightweight
Logic gates
Power demand
Power dissipation
Reconstruction
Signal to noise ratio
wave dynamic differential logic
Weight reduction
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Summary:A false key-based advanced encryption standard (AES) technique is proposed to prevent the stored secret key leaking from the substitution-box under correlation power analysis (CPA) attacks without significant power and area overhead. Wave dynamic differential logic (WDDL)-based XOR gates are utilized during the reconstruction stage to hide the intermediate data that may be highly correlated with the false key. After applying the false key and designing the reconstruction stage with the WDDL, the minimum measurement-to-disclose value for the proposed lightweight masked AES engine implementation becomes over 150 million against CPA attacks. As compared to an unprotected AES engine, the power, area, and performance overhead of the proposed AES implementation is negligible.
ISSN:1549-8328
1558-0806
DOI:10.1109/TCSI.2017.2702098