Logical Luck

Is guilt always part of the pain of contradiction? If I equivocate, is it always my fault? These issues about blame in logic (and perhaps the logic of blame) bear on central issues in philosophy of mind and language. One focus is the distinction between ignorance and incoherence drawn by Saul Kripke...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Philosophical quarterly 1998-07, Vol.48 (192), p.319-334
Main Author: Sorensen, Roy A.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
A priori knowledge
Contradictories
Equivocation
Ethics
Externalism
Inference
Logic
Musicians
Philosophical logics. Philosophy of language
Philosophy
Rationality
Reason
Reasoning
Uncles
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Summary:Is guilt always part of the pain of contradiction? If I equivocate, is it always my fault? These issues about blame in logic (and perhaps the logic of blame) bear on central issues in philosophy of mind and language. One focus is the distinction between ignorance and incoherence drawn by Saul Kripke in his Pierre puzzle. The second focus is the challenge to privileged access mounted by Hilary Putnam in his twin earth ‘thought‐experiment’. I shall argue that some logical misdeeds are unavoidable. Often this lack of control excuses the misdeed. But not always – for reasons presaged by Bernard Williams in his discussion of moral luck.
ISSN:0031-8094
1467-9213
DOI:10.1111/1467-9213.00103