When and Why Do Takeovers Lead to Fraud?

This paper develops a model explaining how acquisitions of controlling block ownership can facilitate post-takeover fraud by new managers when investor protection is poor. Based on disclosures of embezzlement or breach of fiduciary duty in Korean firms, we find that the probability of explicit looti...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Financial management 2019-03, Vol.48 (1), p.45-76
Main Authors: Byun, Hee Sub, Kim, Woojin, Lee, Eun Jung, Park, Kyung Suh
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Acquisition
Acquisitions and mergers
Analysis
Breach of trust
Disclosure of information
Embezzlement
Fiduciary duties
Financial management
Fraud
Investor relations
Looting
Ownership
Takeovers
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Summary:This paper develops a model explaining how acquisitions of controlling block ownership can facilitate post-takeover fraud by new managers when investor protection is poor. Based on disclosures of embezzlement or breach of fiduciary duty in Korean firms, we find that the probability of explicit looting in takeover targets is 13%, almost five times as large as a matched sample of non-targets. Post-takeover frauds are primarily driven by transfers of minority blocks, while the corresponding probability in majority acquisitions is statistically indistinguishable from the non-targets. These findings may explain why minority acquisitions of controlling blocks are popular under poor investor protection.
ISSN:0046-3892
1755-053X
DOI:10.1111/fima.12213