'One Hell of a Gamble': Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964

The new information sheds additional light on peripheral aspects of the crisis and helps to flesh out details of a reasonably well-known story. On the Soviet side, the authors have found more evidence that thoughtful Soviet military officials doubted Soviet missiles could be deployed in Cuba without...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:International journal (Toronto) 1997, Vol.52 (4), p.725-726
Main Author: Lebow, Richard Ned
Format: Review
Language:English
Subjects:
Castro, Fidel
History
International relations
Kennedy, John F
Khrushchev, Nikita
Reviews
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Summary:The new information sheds additional light on peripheral aspects of the crisis and helps to flesh out details of a reasonably well-known story. On the Soviet side, the authors have found more evidence that thoughtful Soviet military officials doubted Soviet missiles could be deployed in Cuba without prior discovery by American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. When Major-General A.A. Dementyev warned Rodion Malinovsky, the defence minister, of the danger, he was rebuked, presumably because Malinovsky knew that [Khrushchev] had already committed himself to the deployment. Ministry of Defence documents provide more detailed information on the deployment of nuclear warheads to Cuba and the debate and decisions surrounding the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons against an American invasion of Cuba. Of more interest for the big picture is the authors' access to the occasional notes of Presidium sessions taken by Vladimir N. Malin, the head of the General Department of the Central Committee.
ISSN:0020-7020
2052-465X
DOI:10.2307/40203251