A Signaling Perspective on Disengagement from Gangs

Extant theoretical work on gang exit has focused more on the pushes and pulls that motivate de-identification, rather than the mechanisms underlying the process of disengagement. How gang members successfully communicate their unobservable “inner change” to outsiders and eventually escape the grip o...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Justice quarterly 2019-01, Vol.36 (1), p.31-58
Main Authors: Densley, James A., Pyrooz, David C.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Crime
Crime prevention
Economic models
Gangs
Identification
Interest groups
Knowledge
Measures
Tests
Theory
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Summary:Extant theoretical work on gang exit has focused more on the pushes and pulls that motivate de-identification, rather than the mechanisms underlying the process of disengagement. How gang members successfully communicate their unobservable “inner change” to outsiders and eventually escape the grip of the gang is unresolved. This article reinterprets the current inventory of knowledge on gang disengagement through the lens of signaling theory. We position de-identification as private information that the gang member must signal to competing stakeholders—the gang, rival gangs, crime control agents—in order to successfully progress through the stages of disengagement established in prior theory and research. We explore how mechanisms of signaling, screening, and credible commitments underline continuity and change in levels of gang embeddedness and examine the role of the receivers of signals in validating disengagement. We conclude with testable hypotheses, the generality of the model, and associated implications for research and practice.
ISSN:0741-8825
1745-9109
DOI:10.1080/07418825.2017.1357743