Irrational Ignorance at the Patent Office

There is widespread belief that the Patent Office issues too many "bad" patents that impose significant harms on society. At first glance, the solution to the patent quality crisis seems straightforward: give patent examiners more time to review applications so that they grant patents only...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Vanderbilt law review 2019-04, Vol.72 (3), p.975-1030
Main Authors: Frakes, Michael D, Wasserman, Melissa F
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Cost control
Elasticity of demand
Ignorance
Lemley, Mark
Litigation
Methods
Patent licensing
Price elasticity
Quality control
Quality management
Taxation
Validity
Workforce
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:There is widespread belief that the Patent Office issues too many "bad" patents that impose significant harms on society. At first glance, the solution to the patent quality crisis seems straightforward: give patent examiners more time to review applications so that they grant patents only to those inventions that deserve them. Yet the answer to the harms of invalid patents may not be that easy. It is possible that the Patent Office is, as Mark Lemley famously wrote, "rationally ignorant." In Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, Lemley argued that because so few patents are economically significant, it makes sense to rely on litigation to make detailed validity determinations in those rare cases rather than increase the expenses associated with conducting a more thorough review of all patent applications. He supported his thesis with a cost-benefit calculation in which he concluded that the costs of giving examiners more time outweigh the benefits of doing so.
ISSN:0042-2533
1942-9886