International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution

Bradley considers some of the constitutional implications of US delegations of authority to international institutions, such as the UN Security Council, the World Trade Organization, and NAFTA. Despite its isolationist reputation, and despite recently announcing that it would not become a party to t...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Stanford law review 2003-05, Vol.55 (5), p.1557-1596
Main Author: Bradley, Curtis A.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Constitutional law
Customary international law
Delegation of authority
Delegation of powers
Executive branch
Federal law
Foreign affairs
International agencies
International aspects
International law
International organizations
International relations-US
Powers and duties
Statutory law
Treaties
United States Supreme Court doctrines
War
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Summary:Bradley considers some of the constitutional implications of US delegations of authority to international institutions, such as the UN Security Council, the World Trade Organization, and NAFTA. Despite its isolationist reputation, and despite recently announcing that it would not become a party to the International Criminal Court, the US has committed itself to many of these international institutions.
ISSN:0038-9765
1939-8581