Learning from One's Mistakes: Epistemic Modesty and the Nature of Belief

I argue that it is not ideally rational to believe that some of one's current beliefs are false, despite the impressive inductive evidence concerning others and our former selves. One's own current beliefs represent a commitment which would be undermined by taking some of them to be false.

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Pacific philosophical quarterly 2001-06, Vol.82 (2), p.157-177
Main Author: Evnine, Simon J.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Epistemology
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Philosophy
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Summary:I argue that it is not ideally rational to believe that some of one's current beliefs are false, despite the impressive inductive evidence concerning others and our former selves. One's own current beliefs represent a commitment which would be undermined by taking some of them to be false.
ISSN:0279-0750
1468-0114
DOI:10.1111/1468-0114.00123