Nested Game of Elections in Iran

• Published in: Middle East policy 2019-09, Vol.26 (3), p.92-106
• Main Author: Ghobadzadeh, Naser
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Change agents; Clergy; Demonstrations & protests; Discontent; Economic conditions; Governance; Management; Optimism; Political change; Political systems; Politics; Popularity; Presidential elections; Public opinion; Reforms; Sanctions; Voting
• ISSN: 1061-1924; 1475-4967
• DOI: 10.1111/mepo.12440

Iran’s political landscape witnessed a month-long series of public protests from the final days of 2017 until the end of January 2018. According to the interior minister, an unprecedented number of cities — more than 100 in total — bore witness to these protests. Although the ruling clergy managed to stabilize the situation, the protests have continued, albeit in a sporadic way, up until the present. While the chorus of voices seeking regime change has become louder, reform discourse is earning scant popularity in the political lexicon of the country. This situation is attributable partly to the hostile approach adopted by the Trump administration in abandoning the joint nuclear deal with Iran and reintroducing sanctions. Additionally, the current U.S. administration has increased its ties with, and support for, the Iranian opposition groups that seek regime change. However, external factors offer only a partial explanation for the recent political upheaval.The main source of the volatile political situation is the widespread dissatisfaction attributable to Iran’s economic and political woes, although such discontent is not a new phenomenon. For years, many Iranians have been disillusioned with governance by the clerics. That notwithstanding, members of the ruling clergy have managed to create periods of hope for meaningful change. By holding elections and allowing limited levels of policy re-form, they have successfully quelled public dissatisfaction, at least temporarily. The Reform Era (1997-2005), for example, was a time of great expectation for the trans-formation of the clergy-dominated polity. During the 2013 presidential elections, yet another wave of optimism urged many to vote for Rouhani, a moderate who promised to reorient the course of the country’s economic, political and cultural aairs.However, these periods of optimism have failed to bring about any meaningful change; instead, they have prolonged the dissatisfaction with the ruling clergy. The hope of reform from within sparked by Rouhani’s rise in 2013 has rapidly diminished. This begs the question: is this just another failed attempt by reformists to transform the polity, or does it imply an innate political obstacle that makes reform from within impossible?