Averting Nuclear Catastrophe

For more than 50 years, the United States has depended on deterrence for defense against its principal adversaries. But deterrence can be trusted no longer. Today's adversary values his life less than the death of Americans. This adversary is not a candidate for deterrence. Moreover, while he l...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Harvard international review 2005-01, Vol.26 (4), p.84
Main Author: Gallucci, Robert L
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Cooperation
Counterterrorism
Deterrence
Foreign policy
Military policy
Nuclear weapons
Politics
Prevention
Terrorism
Uranium
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Summary:For more than 50 years, the United States has depended on deterrence for defense against its principal adversaries. But deterrence can be trusted no longer. Today's adversary values his life less than the death of Americans. This adversary is not a candidate for deterrence. Moreover, while he lacks a ballistic missile delivery system, he has such a variety of other means to deliver a nuclear weapon that the United States cannot have any confidence in its ability to mount a sustained defense by denial. Unless many changes are made, it is more likely than not that Al Qaeda or one of its affiliates will detonate a nuclear weapon in a US city within the next 5 to 10 years. The US should at least consider two additional policies: preventive war to deal with rogue suppliers and expanded deterrence to obtain the cooperation needed to stop leakage of fissile material.
ISSN:0739-1854
2374-6564