Halévy's Bentham Is Bentham

A reply to Fransisco Vergara's attack on Halévy's interpretation of Bentham in Philosophy, January, 1998. Vergara had argued that Halévy was mistaken in interpreting Bentham's principle of utility as a psychological law as well as the ethical greatest happiness principle. Mongin and S...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Philosophy (London) 1999-04, Vol.74 (2), p.271-281
Main Authors: Mongin, Philippe, Sigot, Nathalie
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Benevolence
Deontology
Discussion
Halevy, Fromental (Jacques-Francois-Fromental-Elie) (1799-1862)
Happiness
Legislators
Literary criticism
Philosophy
Philosophy of action
Pleasure
Radicalism
Selfishness
String
Sympathy
Theory of values and moral philosophy. Philosophy of action
Utilitarianism
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Summary:A reply to Fransisco Vergara's attack on Halévy's interpretation of Bentham in Philosophy, January, 1998. Vergara had argued that Halévy was mistaken in interpreting Bentham's principle of utility as a psychological law as well as the ethical greatest happiness principle. Mongin and Sigot show that Halévy correctly interpreted Bentham's texts and that the psychological law is necessary to Bentham's legal theory, economics and politics; they also argue that it is incorrect to confuse the principle of utility with a theory of universal selfishness, and that this misunderstanding underlies Vergara's mistaken picture of both Halévy and Bentham.
ISSN:0031-8191
1469-817X
DOI:10.1017/S0031819199000297