Two ways of relating to (and acting for) reasons

• Published in: Mind & language 2018-11, Vol.33 (5), p.441-459
• Main Authors: Arruda, Caroline T., Povinelli, Daniel J.
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Acting; acting for reasons; agency; Agents; intentional action; Intentionality; Reasoning; reasons
• ISSN: 0268-1064; 1468-0017
• DOI: 10.1111/mila.12185

Most views of agency take acting for reasons (whether explanatory or justifying) to be an important hallmark of the capacity for agency. The problem, however, is that the standard analysis of what it is to act in light of reasons is not sufficiently fine grained to accommodate what we will argue are the myriad types of ways that agents can do so. We suggest that a full account of acting for reasons must also recognize the relationship that agents have with their reasons. We focus on two types of relationships. The first is the traditional case, where agents act in light of reasons that they take to be their own and that they endorse. We describe this as possessing an Endorsement Relationship with one's reasons. A second way of relating to reasons is what we will describe as possessing a Directed Relationship with one's reasons. This includes cases in which agents' actions are the product of reasons but toward which agents do not have an Endorsement Relationship. The Endorsement Relationship is uncontroversial. In this paper, we defend the existence and importance of the Directed Relationship. We show that it is a genuine but overlooked way of relating to, and thereby acting for, reasons.