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Equilibrium and Welfare in Unregulated Airline Markets
An analysis is made of how unregulated airline markets can be expected to perform. The basic results of a monopolistically competitive model of airline markets are: 1. When the direct benefits to consumers of increasing flight frequency are exhausted, socially optimal choices of price and frequency...
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Published in: | The American economic review 1979-05, Vol.69 (2), p.92-95 |
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Main Author: | |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | An analysis is made of how unregulated airline markets can be expected to perform. The basic results of a monopolistically competitive model of airline markets are: 1. When the direct benefits to consumers of increasing flight frequency are exhausted, socially optimal choices of price and frequency result in zero profits for the industry. 2. A noncooperative, free entry equilibrium always results in higher prices, lower load factors, and greater frequency than are socially optimal. The divergence between the Nash equilibrium and a zero profit welfare optimum suggests that, in theory, a policy of price regulation and free entry would produce higher welfare than a policy of complete deregulation. Whether or not the current unwieldy regulatory apparatus is retained in order to improve market performance must ultimately depend upon the quantitative divergence of the unregulated equilibrium from the welfare optimum. Intelligent policy formulation requires accurate estimation of structural air travel demand functions capable of isolating the effects of frequency and load factor as well as price. |
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ISSN: | 0002-8282 1944-7981 |