IDEOLOGICAL DRIFT AMONG SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: WHO, WHEN, AND HOW IMPORTANT?

The implication is clear: contrary to the claims of prominent scholars, the President and his supporters in the Senate cannot guarantee the "entrenchment" of their ideology on the Court in the long, or even medium, term.15 As a result, the President may be best off placing comparatively gr...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Northwestern University law review 2007-09, Vol.101 (4), p.1483
Main Authors: Epstein, Lee, Martin, Andrew D, Quinn, Kevin M, Segal, Jeffrey A
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Appointments & personnel changes
Conservatism
Hearings & confirmations
Ideology
Nominations
Political appointments
Presidents
State laws
Supreme Court decisions
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Summary:The implication is clear: contrary to the claims of prominent scholars, the President and his supporters in the Senate cannot guarantee the "entrenchment" of their ideology on the Court in the long, or even medium, term.15 As a result, the President may be best off placing comparatively greater emphasis on advancing the interests of his political party-rather than his own ideological interests-through the appointment of Justices designed to appease particular constituencies. To provide but one example, had Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's initial preferences remained stable, odds are that she would not have provided the fifth vote to uphold Michigan Law School's affirmative action program in the 2003 case, Grutter v. Bollinger.16 The implications of this finding are many, not the least of which is that attorneys' expectations about success (or failure) with particular Justices may rest on shakier ground than they suspect.
ISSN:0029-3571