Life and Mind: Varieties of Neo-Aristotelianism: Naive, Sophisticated, Hegelian

• Published in: Hegel bulletin 2020-04, Vol.41 (1), p.40-60
• Main Author: Kern, Andrea
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Animals; Aristotle (384-322 BC); Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770-1831); Philosophy; Rationality
• ISSN: 2051-5367; 2051-5375
• DOI: 10.1017/hgl.2019.11

In his treatment of subjective mind, Hegel argues that the development that characterizes the vital process of a human individual is logically unique in that it dissolves the contradiction between two logical determinations that characterize any vital activity: the contradiction between the ‘immediate singularity’ of the subject of this process and its ‘abstract generality’. Hegel employs the term Bildung to characterize any vital activity that has this form. The idea that the distinction between human life and non-human life is a logical distinction is one of the main lessons that Hegel thinks we should learn from Aristotle's treatment of the idea of life. In this article I distinguish between two contemporary varieties of this Aristotelian idea: a sophisticated variety that emphasizes the idea of second nature in order to characterize the distinctiveness of the human, and a naive variety that thinks of the human's uniqueness in terms of characterizations that already belong to its first nature. I argue that Hegel is neither sophisticated nor naive but offers a third variety of Neo-Aristotelianism that solves the difficulties of the other two. This has decisive consequences for his understanding of Bildung . Although the notion of Bildung describes an empirical process, Hegel argues, it is not an empirical concept. Rather, it is the concrete concept of the process of actualization that characterizes a self-conscious form of life that reflects the inner temporality of this form's actuality.