Formal proofs for the security of signcryption

Signcryption is an asymmetric cryptographic method that provides simultaneously both message confidentiality and unforgeability at a low computational and communication overhead. In this paper we propose realistic security models for signcryption, which give the attacker power to choose both message...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of cryptology 2007-04, Vol.20 (2), p.203-235
Main Authors: BAEK, Joonsang, STEINFELD, Ron, YULIANG ZHENG
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Applied sciences
Confidentiality
Cryptography
Digital signatures
Encryption
Exact sciences and technology
Information, signal and communications theory
Security
Signal and communications theory
Telecommunications and information theory
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Summary:Signcryption is an asymmetric cryptographic method that provides simultaneously both message confidentiality and unforgeability at a low computational and communication overhead. In this paper we propose realistic security models for signcryption, which give the attacker power to choose both messages/signcryptexts as well as recipient/sender public keys when accessing the signcryption/unsigncryption oracles of attacked entities. We then show that Zheng's original signcryption scheme is secure in our confidentiality model relative to the Gap Diffie-Hellman problem and is secure in our unforgeability model relative to a Gap version of the discrete logarithm problem. All these results are shown in the random oracle model.
ISSN:0933-2790
1432-1378
DOI:10.1007/s00145-007-0211-0