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Do State Reviews of Communications Mergers Serve the Public Interest?

Eisenach and Kulick examine how state reviews of communications mergers serve the interest of the public in the US. The appropriate role of state governments in the merger review process has been the subject of vigorous debate among academics and policymakers. Supporters of state involvement argue t...

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Published in:Federal communications law journal 2019-05, Vol.71 (2), p.125-153
Main Authors: Eisenach, Jeffrey A, Kulick, Robert
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Language:English
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description Eisenach and Kulick examine how state reviews of communications mergers serve the interest of the public in the US. The appropriate role of state governments in the merger review process has been the subject of vigorous debate among academics and policymakers. Supporters of state involvement argue that states may have unique local knowledge of competitive conditions or other comparative advantages that allow them to add value to the enforcement efforts of federal antitrust watchdogs at the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. Critics question the benefits of state intervention and also point to the costs, arguing that state reviews are duplicative, costly, and involve unnecessary delays. Critics also note that state enforcers face incentives to place parochial political interests ahead of overall consumer welfare or the broader public interest and thus to impose merger conditions that benefit narrower constituencies to the detriment of the public at large. Here, a study that presents empirical analysis of the effects of public utility commission oversight of mergers involving communications carriers is explored.
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source Nexis UK; Social Science Premium Collection; ABI/INFORM Global; Politics Collection; PAIS Index
subjects Acquisitions and mergers
Analysis
Antitrust
Bankruptcy
Clayton Antitrust Act 1914-US
Communication
Communications industry
Competition
Constituents
Economics
Enforcement
Evaluation
Externality
Government agencies
Influence
Laws, regulations and rules
Local knowledge
Mergers, acquisitions and divestments
Policy making
Public interest
State government
State intervention
Telecommunications services industry
Waiting period
Welfare
Welfare recipients
title Do State Reviews of Communications Mergers Serve the Public Interest?
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