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The provision of infrastructure: benefit–cost criteria for optimizing local governments
This paper models the provision of a local public good that is simultaneously utilized as a public consumption good and a public intermediate good. Since the public good enters both utility and production functions, it is considered a “generalized public good.” This is done to model the provision of...
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Published in: | International tax and public finance 2020-06, Vol.27 (3), p.552-574 |
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Main Author: | |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that this one cites |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | This paper models the provision of a local public good that is simultaneously utilized as a public consumption good and a public intermediate good. Since the public good enters both utility and production functions, it is considered a “generalized public good.” This is done to model the provision of infrastructure by sub-federal governments, which is financed with taxes on local residents. Households are mobile in the model, and the theoretical analysis provides a benefit–cost rule for public good provision by a rent-maximizing local government. Illustrative calculations of the marginal cost of public funds are provided, and they show a wide range of values matching previous estimates of the marginal productivity of infrastructure. The impact of intergovernmental transfers on the provision of infrastructure by rent-maximizing local governments is presented. |
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ISSN: | 0927-5940 1573-6970 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s10797-019-09577-2 |