Anscombe on Brute Facts and Human Affairs

In ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ Anscombe writes: ‘It is not profitable at present for us to do moral philosophy. It should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking’. In consideration of this Anscombe appeals to the relation of ‘...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Royal Institute of Philosophy supplement 2020-07, Vol.87, p.85-99
Main Author: Wiseman, Rachael
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Ethics
Logic
Morality
Philosophers
Philosophy
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Summary:In ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ Anscombe writes: ‘It is not profitable at present for us to do moral philosophy. It should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking’. In consideration of this Anscombe appeals to the relation of ‘brute-relative-to’ which holds between facts and descriptions of human affairs. This paper describes the reorientation in philosophy of action that this relation aims to effect and examines the claim that this reorientation makes possible the sort of philosophy of psychology that can provide a starting point for ethics.
ISSN:1358-2461
1755-3555
DOI:10.1017/S1358246119000171