Responding to (un)reasonable requests by an authority

We consider the notions of static and dynamic reasonableness of requests by an authority in a trust game experiment. The authority, modeled as the experimenter, systematically varies the experimental norm of what is expected from trustees to return to trustors, both in terms of the level of each req...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Theory and decision 2020-10, Vol.89 (3), p.287-311
Main Authors: Pelligra, Vittorio, Reggiani, Tommaso, Zizzo, Daniel John
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Authority
Behavioral/Experimental Economics
Bias
Compliance
Credibility
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Finance
Game Theory
Games
Hypotheses
Insurance
Management
Operations Research/Decision Theory
Social and Behav. Sciences
Statistics for Business
Trust
Trustees
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Summary:We consider the notions of static and dynamic reasonableness of requests by an authority in a trust game experiment. The authority, modeled as the experimenter, systematically varies the experimental norm of what is expected from trustees to return to trustors, both in terms of the level of each request and in terms of the sequence of the requests. Static reasonableness matters in a self-biased way, in the sense that low requests justify returning less, but high requests tend to be ignored. Dynamic reasonableness also matters, in the sense that, if requests keep increasing, trustees return less compared to the same requests presented in random or decreasing order. Requests never systematically increase trustworthiness but may decrease it.
ISSN:0040-5833
1573-7187
DOI:10.1007/s11238-020-09758-0