Climate Change, Livelihoods, and Conflict in the Sahel

• Published in: Georgetown journal of international affairs 2020-10, Vol.21 (1), p.12-20
• Main Author: Mbaye, Ahmadou Aly
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Civil service; Clientelism; Climate change; Conflict; Corruption; Desertification; Disadvantaged; Drought; Environmental degradation; Food prices; Islam; Legitimation; Military service; Mobility; Natural disasters; Natural resources; Patronage; Political power; Presidential systems; Radicalism; Rainfall; Rent-seeking; Riots; Scarcity; Security; Segregation; Smuggling; Trends; Violence; Weapons
• ISSN: 1526-0054; 2471-8831; 2471-8831
• DOI: 10.1353/gia.2020.0020

In the Sahel, regional climatic trends show an overall rise in temperature, coupled with an erratic trend in rainfall. [...]the region faces a growing number of natural disasters, the frequency and intensity of which are expected to further rise in the near future.1 Desertification, drought, floods, and sea level rise, among others, are all affecting the availability of natural resources.2 In a context where natural resources are the main sources of livelihoods, environmental degradation significantly impacts people's resilience and makes them highly vulnerable.3 In parallel, the region faces serious political turmoil and radical Islamist threats, which have caused serious security challenges within and across national borders. Precipitation and Resource Scarcity in Niger. Since 2009, lower investment returns have led to slower growth and increases in the debt to GDP ratio. The remoteness and inaccessibility of the terrain limits governments' abil ity to ensure security. [...]lack of full control over territory prevents African states from providing basic services to populations located in some remote areas. According to some estimates, up to 65 percent of ethnopolitical minorities in Africa are disadvantaged in terms of access to top positions in politics, civil service, and the military. [...]up to 70 percent of the political and economic segregation these groups face is more severe compared to the global average.16 Likewise, the patronage hypothesis is also confirmed in African democracies, considering the following three dimensions: presidentialism with high power concentration, clientelism rewarding clients (public jobs, budget allocation, license, contracts, projects, etc.), and the use of public resources for public legitimation.17 Lastly, the way governments respond to disasters is also shaped by clientelism.18 In many instances, officials in Niger and Mali have diverted resources intended for humanitarian assistance to their personal profit.19 Hence, in the Sahel, the risk of conflict stemming from climate change is related to preexisting economic, political, and physical vulnerabilities in communities, where the politics of resources and risk distribution af fect instability.20 Restricted mobility for pastoralists, political negligence, corruption, and rent-seeking are the major drivers of conflict.21 Rather than climate change, governmental failure to regulate components of contested livelihoods, compounded by recent gun proliferation, is critic