Accuracy, conditionalization, and probabilism

Accuracy-based arguments for conditionalization and probabilism appear to have a significant advantage over their Dutch Book rivals. They rely only on the plausible epistemic norm that one should try to decrease the inaccuracy of one’s beliefs. Furthermore, conditionalization and probabilism apparen...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Synthese (Dordrecht) 2021-05, Vol.198 (5), p.4017-4033
Main Authors: Lewis, Peter J., Fallis, Don
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Accuracy
Beliefs
Dutch language
Education
Epistemology
Logic
Metaphysics
Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Science
Probability
Utilitarianism
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Summary:Accuracy-based arguments for conditionalization and probabilism appear to have a significant advantage over their Dutch Book rivals. They rely only on the plausible epistemic norm that one should try to decrease the inaccuracy of one’s beliefs. Furthermore, conditionalization and probabilism apparently follow from a wide range of measures of inaccuracy. However, we argue that there is an under-appreciated diachronic constraint on measures of inaccuracy which limits the measures from which one can prove conditionalization, and none of the remaining measures allow one to prove probabilism. That is, among the measures in the literature, there are some from which one can prove conditionalization, others from which one can prove probabilism, but none from which one can prove both. Hence at present, the accuracy-based approach cannot underwrite both conditionalization and probabilism.
ISSN:0039-7857
1573-0964
DOI:10.1007/s11229-019-02298-3