Selection By Consequences In The Ontogeny Of Behavior: The Problem Of The First Instance

Selection by consequences occurs in both phylogeny and ontogeny. In both domains, qualitative characters pose the 'problem of the first instance'—i.e., the problem that selection can explain the spread of a qualitative character within a population of individuals, but it cannot explain the...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Behavior and philosophy 2019-01, Vol.47, p.1-14
Main Author: Smith, Terry L.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Birds
Genotype & phenotype
Population
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Summary:Selection by consequences occurs in both phylogeny and ontogeny. In both domains, qualitative characters pose the 'problem of the first instance'—i.e., the problem that selection can explain the spread of a qualitative character within a population of individuals, but it cannot explain the first instance of that character. By contrast, selection is able to explain even the first instance of a quantitative character. Skinner limits the analogy between phylogeny and ontogeny precisely along this divide. Although qualitative characters exist in phylogeny, Skinner does not think they exist in ontogeny. This is one of the foundational differences between cognitive science and behavior science. The first purports to explain regularities in the ontogeny of qualitative characters, the latter purports to explain regularities in the ontogeny of quantitative characters.
ISSN:1053-8348
1943-3328